Abstract-This paper presents a new key management protocol for group based communications for non hierarchical wireless sensor networks (WSNs), applied on a recently proposed IP based multicast protocol. Confidentiality, integrity, and authentication are established, using solely symmetric key based operations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) has grown tremendously during the last decade, due to the multitude of application areas. Besides classical IP based unicast communication, also IP multicast (point-to-multipoint communication) can be used. Motes can subscribe to (or unsubscribe from) a multicast group, allowing the sender to reach multiple destinations by sending a single IP multicast packet.
This can be useful when a temperature sensor has to inform many other devices (such as the heating control, an interactive wall display or a smartphone) about its measurement. Another case in which multicast may be useful is the transmission of a command to several actuators. Having a multicast address to reach those actuators, avoids keeping a list of their IP addresses in the mote. A multicast packet can be sent to that group and all actuators that subscribed to the group will get the command. Other real-world examples are: turning on all the lights of a room, changing the refreshment timer parameter of all temperature sensors in a house or turning off all air conditioning machines when no presence in the house is detected.
The framework proposed in [1] for group based communications, with the integration of a network multicast manager (NMM), allows for a reduced bandwidth usage with a minimal memory footprint, by integrating multicast groups in the publish/subscribe paradigm.
Security in WSNs has been extensively researched and standardization efforts have been made. However, these standardisations often do not include mechanisms for key management, in particular not for group based communications. Nevertheless, key management is essential in this whole procedure in order to send secure and authenticated messages. Minimal security features to be established are confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. Efficient mechanisms are required, due to the limited bandwidth, processing power, storage capacities, and available power. Efficiency implies scalability and adjustability [2] . Scalability in the sense that the key management protocol is able to include additional nodes in a secure manner during the network's lifetime. Adjustability implies a proper mechanism to deal with network condition changes.
In this paper, we will propose a practical key management protocol for group based communications, which is applicable for any type of architecture and thus not limited to hierarchical architectures. Moreover, the protocol is implemented on top of an existing IP multicast protocol, being the Bidirectional Multicast RPL Forwarding (BMRF) protocol [3] , based on the framework proposed in [1] . The mechanisms to derive the multicast group keys are constructed in such a way that the number of communication phases among the involved entities, as well as packet fragmentation, is kept as low as possible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview about the related work. Section III explains the network architecture with some key definitions and assumptions used. In Section IV, we explain the different phases of our scheme in normal mode into detail. Sections V describes the security analysis and finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In general, there are three main approaches for key management in WSNs: symmetric key cryptography, public key cryptography, and hybrid. Especially, in a hierarchical architecture, it can make sense to use an hybrid approach, in which the most computational heavy operations are performed by a powered mote. Often, authentication and integrity are obtained by digital signatures. However, as there is a huge performance difference between symmetric key and public key cryptography, it is still interesting to look at symmetric key based solutions, due to the limited energy, communication bandwidth, and computational capacities of the sensor nodes.
Several proposals for key management using a symmetric key based approach in WSNs have been published. These can be split in two categories, depending on the assumed topology, being a hierarchical and non hierarchical or distributed architecture of the nodes [4] . Most proposals for symmetric-key based key management protocols assume a hierarchical network, in which the nodes have a predefined position in the network.
Within the domain of symmetric-key based, authenticated key management protocols for hierarchical networks, the Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) [5] is the most complete one. It describes procedures to derive keys for the most common communication scenarios, being between two cluster nodes (CNs), a group key for all nodes in a cluster, and a network key shared by all nodes. References [6] , [7] present randomized approaches for the key management in hierarchical networks, which have no guarantee on successful key establishment but limit the impact of a compromised node. Both protocols ( [6] , [7] ) have huge storage requirements in each of the nodes in the network. Furthermore, partial solutions for authenticated symmetric key based protocols can be found in [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] . In [8] , a method using oneway functions to derive an authenticated pairwise key between CN and cluster head (CH) is explained. Group keys are not derived in this paper. In [9] , each node receives an evaluation of a point on a pre-defined bivariate polynomial of the base station (BS), dependent on its place in the sensor topology. For the computation of the group key, Lagrange interpolation is used, but a lot of unicast communications are required to send the group key to the individual members. Moreover, no method for using this group key in an authenticated way is explained. Finally, the key management in [10] , [11] is based on a generator matrix, predefined at the BS. The computation of the group key requires the involvement of the BS and cannot be performed by the CH alone. Again no mechanism is described to guarantee authenticated usage of the group key. In addition, the protocols from [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] are restricted to star networks, and thus no mechanism is described to compute a shared key between two CNs of the same cluster.
Solutions for hierarchical network structures are often more efficient, but less flexible as it is not possible to create custom groups, since the supported groups depend on the structure of the network. Therefore, solutions for non hierarchical architectures are necessary. In literature, we can distinguish the key management schemes of [12] , [13] , [14] for this type of architecture. However, the schemes of [13] , [14] are using asymmetric key based methods as the basis of their key establishment system. The scheme in [13] is based on the Merkle identity tree. With this scheme, the direct and secure communications between any subgroups can be implemented and the delay of communication is lowered, making the scheme more flexible for WSNs. In [14] , a building method of a key tree is proposed to reduce computation and storage over- head on every sensor node. In [12] a robot-assisted network bootstrapping technique is proposed. It focuses on scheme efficiency and supports various multicast group semantics. To the best of our knowledge, no symmetric key based methods for key management in distributed WSNs have been identified in literature, as fas as the authors are aware.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Setting
The used setting is shown in Fig. 1 . We consider a WSN with nodes N i for (i = 1, . . . , m). A network multicast manager (NMM), as proposed in [1] , is responsible for the management of the multicast groups. This NMM is considered to be more powerful and takes the role of a network gateway, positioned in the cloud. Nodes contact the NMM and share their capabilities and interests. Based on that information, for each match the NMM will generate a multicast address and share the required security information with the publisher (P ), which is one of the members of the group, chosen by the NMM. The publisher will then be able to construct a group key with the other subscribers (S s , s = 1, . . . , n) of the multicast group. The NNM will not be member of the group, but only responsible for the initialization and verification of the authentication. There can be any amount of intermediate (I) motes between any components of the protocol. These intermediate motes are motes that are not participating in the security protocol. This results in a protocol that is independent of the underlying network architecture.
In order to guarantee that the NMM is not able to follow the multicast communication, an external trusted third party (TTP) will be responsible for the generation and distribution of key material among the nodes and the NMM. Note that we consider an honest but curious NMM, meaning that the NMM will perform all the required steps but might be interested in following the communication for its own purposes (e.g. selling of data to other parties) and thus should not be able to derive the group key.
B. Security requirements
The design goals of the proposed security solution should ensure that the following security features are included.
• Confidentiality. The messages exchanged in a multicast group should only be readable by the authenticated and authorized entities, being the publisher and the subscribers.
• Integrity. The content of the transmitted messages cannot be changed during transmission, without notification of the legitimate communication entities.
• Mutual authentication. The sender is guaranteed that only the intended receivers can receive the message and also vice versa.
• The proposed solution should be resistant against well known attacks such as replay attacks, insider attacks, manin-the-middle attacks and impersonation attacks. Due to the resource constrained nature of the sensor nodes, the protocol should be designed as efficiently as possible. This implies the minimization of the number of communication phases and the number of expensive cryptographic operations.
C. Notations
We represent a hash function by H. The encryption operation of a message m under a key K to obtain the ciphertext c is denoted as c = E K (m), and the corresponding decryption operation as m = D K (c). 
D. Attack model
The attackers may come from inside or outside the network. They are able to eavesdrop on the traffic, inject new messages, replay and change old messages, or spoof other identities.
We assume the TTP as fully trustworthy and the NMM as honest but curious. We further assume that the NMM does not collaborate with malicious nodes. Moreover, we assume that the security related information at the nodes and at the NMM is stored in tamper resistant hardware, which is currently very common and available at reasonable price.
Note that we do not discuss the mechanisms to detect malbehavior of a node, e.g. by storing trust tables in each node. Therefore, we refer to the literature on intrusion detection mechanisms [15] and attestation mechanisms [16] to detect abnormal behaviour of a compromised node.
IV. SECURITY SCHEME We distinguish five different phases in our security scheme. First, there is the key distribution phase, in which the TTP distributes the secret key material to the different participants. Second, in the registration phase, the nodes share their capabilities and interests with the NMM. Third, when the multicast groups are defined by the NMM, during the group key construction phase, the NMM shares the required information with the publisher P, allowing the construction of the group key. Fourth, in the multicast communication phase, the publisher securely communicates data to the subscribed members. Finally, there is the group key update phase, in which the process is discussed when a node leaves or joins a multicast group.
A. Key distribution phase
In this phase, the TTP selects three master secret values x, y, z ∈ F q 2 and generates two different types of security related information. The first type is for the nodes N i with i = 1, . . . , m in the network and the second type is for the NMM. Denote the identity of N i by ID i and NMM by ID N M M . First, for each N i , the TTP executes the following computations:
The values K i , B i , H(A i ), H(x), ID N M M are sent over a secure channel to each node N i . Here B i will replace the identity of the node for the outside world. The parameter H(A i ) will be used to authenticate its identity with the NMM, and H(x) for the authentication of NMM with the node. The value K i represents a common shared secret key with the TTP and will be used to remotely update the security material by the TTP at later stages.
The security related information for the NMM is limited to the two parameters H(ID N M M H(x)) and H(y), which are also securely sent by the TTP to the NMM. Note that the scheme is constructed in such a way that multiple NMMs can be considered. Only the identities of the different NMMs should then be communicated to the nodes. For ease in notation, we restrict the explanation to a situation involving only one NMM.
B. Registration phase
In the registration phase, the legitimate nodes, being the nodes with security material generated by the TTP, contact the NMM to construct a common shared secret key. Therefore, the N i first selects a random value R 1 at timestamp T 1 and computes the following two values.
Upon arrival, the NMM first checks if the current timestamp T 2 is not much larger than T 1 . If so, the NMM then derives the random value R 1 using its stored secret H(y).
In order to check the integrity of R 1 , the parameters R 1 , T 1 , H(A i ) together with its secret key material H(ID N M M H(x)) will be substituted into the hash value
. If the result is equal to the received M 2 , the NMM continues the process. Otherwise, the communication is stopped. Next, the NMM also chooses a random value R 2 and computes
Note that k i represents a common shared secret key between N i and NMM. The message T 2 , M 3 , M 4 is sent from the NMM to the node N i .
After receiving this message, the node first verifies the freshness of the communication, i.e. if the current timestamp T 3 is not much higher than T 2 . If so, it continues and derives R 2 from M 3 . Using this value, the key k i can be computed and its integrity checked with the parameter M 4 .
As a result, both N i and NMM possess a mutual authenticated shared key, which is used to communicate the interests and capabilities of N i to NNM.
C. Group key construction phase
Based on the information received after the registration phase with the NMM, the multicast groups are created. For each group, a multicast address ID G is generated. The NMM communicates the address ID G to each subscriber, denoted by S s , s = 1, ..., n (with corresponding key material A s , B s ). To the publisher of the group, denoted by P , (with corresponding key material A p , B p ) key related information of the subscribers in its group is sent using their common shared key k p . This key related information for each subscriber equals to k ps = H(ID G k s ) is combined with identity B s , for all S s with s = 1, ..., n in the multicast group. Consequently, the message
is sent to the publisher. After decryption of this message, P possesses a common shared key with each of its subscribers. This information allows P to share a randomly chosen group key k g for the multicast communication.
Here, P first chooses a random value k g , which will serve as the group key to be shared with the other members in a multicast communication message. It also chooses a random value h 0 for the construction of a one-way key chain [17] to be used for authentication purposes. Consequently, w consecutive hashes are taken, i.e.
. The value h w will also be shared with the members.
Since P has a common key with each member of the group, two methods can be utilized, called the multicast and unicast approach. In the multicast approach, a combination of Lagrange interpolation (LI), a classical technique from the secret sharing approach, with the communication of an IP multicast packet is applied. In the unicast approach, multiple IP unicast packets are sent to simply share the encrypted group key to each of the individual nodes. We now discuss both approaches more into detail. (x s , y s ) = (B s , k ps ) with s = 1, . . . , n, together with the point containing the group key (0, k g ), a polynomial of degree n can be constructed. Next, n other points (v, V v ) with v = 1, ..., n on this polynomial are derived. Finally, P sends using the multicast address ID g the following message
1) Multicast approach: Using Lagrange interpolation (LI) through the n points
with T g the current timestamp.
Upon arrival of this message with the subscribers of the multicast group ID G , the subscriber S s , s = 1, ..., n first constructs the polynomial through the n + 1 points with coordinates (v, V v ), (for v = 1, ..., n) and its own point (B s , H(ID G k s ) ). Next the group key k g is derived as the intersection point of this polynomial with the X-axis. Its integrity is checked using the hash value of the message.
2) Unicast approach:
In the unicast approach, P shares the random value k g through the following message with each subscriber (S s , s = 1, ..., n):
Each subscriber can now decrypt this message using its secret key. After xoring the obtained result with the stored value H(x), the subscriber retrieves the group key.
To complete the process (for both the unicast and multicast approaches), each subscriber S s , (s = 1, ..., n) must send an acknowledge of reception to the publisher P .
If after decryption of the second part of the message, the hash value of the original timestamp T g and hash value h w are found, the publisher stores the rest of the ciphertext H(T g h w k s ). If all acknowledgements have been collected, P computes
and sends this result to the NMM. The NMM can compute the individual values of this sum and thus check if the resulting sum corresponds with the received value. If so, the NMM approves the multicast group and sends a confirmation using unicast communication to each of the members. If not, the individual messages B s , H(T g h w k s )) should be transmitted to the NMM, such that the potential source of problem can be identified. The members of the multicast group now store k g , h w .
D. Multicast communication phase
Since all members of the multicast group now share the group key k g , confidentiality is easily realized. Authentication of the messages from the publisher is obtained by using the one-way key chain at the side of the publisher and the stored end value h w at the side of the subscriber. As a consequence, P can now securely submit the message M in an authenticated way to its subscribers as follows
Here, T c denotes the current timestamp and h w−1 the hash value prior to h(w). Upon receipt of this message, the subscribers can decrypt the ciphertext and check if h w = H(h w−1 ). If so, the message is authenticated and h w−1 is stored instead of h w .
E. Group key update phase
We consider the following two scenarios.
• If a (honest) node leaves the multicast group, there are again two options. The key distribution process is repeated with the rest of the group to derive a new key. This can be either the multicast approach, resulting in a total of n + 1 messages to be sent in the network for a group of n members, together with some computational complexity for the derivation of the group key. Alternatively, using the unicast communication from the publisher P , an update of the key value is sent to each subscriber individually, corresponding with a total of 2n − 1 messages to be sent.
• If a new node joins the multicast group, a key update is first made in the group using multicast communication. Next, this new key is also shared with the new node through a unicast message from the NMM. By doing so, the new node is not able to decrypt the previous messages from the multicast group.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
First of all, the three security related design goals, as mentioned in Section III, are realized. Thanks to the construction of the different key material between TTP and nodes on the one hand and NMM on the other hand, confidentiality and authentication are guaranteed for unicast communications between nodes and NMM. A part of this key material is shared by the NMM with the publisher, which puts it in the position to construct a common key with the subscribers. Using the parameter H(x), the publisher is able to communicate key related information with the other nodes, which is not visible for the NMM, as this parameter is only shared with the nodes.
The construction of the one-way hash chain ensures the authentication of the publisher. Integrity of all these messages is guaranteed, as an additional hash, containing the most essential values to be shared, is included in each transmitted message. Let us discuss now the resistance of the system against the most important attacks.
Note that the protocol provides security on any type of network architecture, since we only assume a communication channel between the different components that participate in the protocol. How these communication channels are constructed does not influence the validity of the protocol.
A. Resistance against replay attack
Replay attacks have been made impossible as timestamps are included in the messages, both in plaintext and in the hashes that contain key related information. Consequently, the messages sent from the nodes to the NMM and vice versa, during the registration phase, the multicast message sent from the publisher to the subscribers in the group key construction phase and the unicast messages sent from subscribers to publisher, and the actual multicast communication messages cannot be replayed.
B. Resistance against insider attack
If a sensor node is captured or compromised, the group keys to which the node belongs and the parameter H(x) should be updated. Note that the impact of H(x) is not critical, as it has been only used to avoid that the NMM is not able to derive the group key. It is important to mention that an attack on one or more nodes has no influence on the security of the other sensor nodes or other groups in which the malicious node is not involved. In case the captured node is a subscriber node, the attacker will not be able to send a multicast message in the group as it does not possess the one-way hash chain.
C. Resistance against man-in-the-middle attack and impersonation attack
In this type of attack, the adversary (inside or outside the network) tries to take over the role of the sensor node or NMM.
• Sensor node role: It would mean that the adversary is capable of generating a common shared key with the NMM. However, in order to construct a valid message (B i , M 1 , M 2 , T 1 ), the adversary should be able to construct a value H(A i ) or A i , which is related to B i , as fixed in the construction by the TTP. Therefore, that would require the knowledge of either x or H(y), which are both secret values. Without such a common shared key with the NMM, the adversary is not able to participate in the group key construction phase.
• NMM: A node, not installed with the secret value H(y) cannot derive from B i the parameter A i , and thus H(A i ). Therefore, a malicious node cannot prove that it has derived R 1 from the transmitted message (B i , M 1 , M 2 , T 1 ) and thus cannot construct a common shared secret key with the node. As a consequence, the adversary can also not participate in the group key construction phase.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
In order to check the validity of the proposed security scheme, it was implemented in ContikiOS [18] and simulated in COOJA [19] (using COOJA motes). As multicast engine, BMRF [3] is used, with all the default values of Contiki 2.6, except for the changes listed below. As COOJA motes do not support any radio duty cycling (RDC) protocols, nullRDC is used. The following points are taken into account during the implementation.
• Note that the largest variable type that can be used in ContikiOS is a double, which is 8 bytes long. In order to get a 16 byte key, two Lagrange polynomials need to be calculated and transmitted.
• When doing floating point calculations with potentially large numbers (since we are using LI with points that are dependent on the calculated key values, values can get very large), the precision of the result can be limited. To make sure each member works with the same result, they have to be rounded.
• The calculations for the key material are done using two temporary buffers to store intermediate values. The size of these buffers can be set in the configuration files. The minimum required size for these buffers depends on the used approach (unicast or multicast) and on the maximum number of members of the multicast group.
• For encryption, the AES128 library, written by Texas Instuments [20] is used. For hashing, a sha256 library [21] is used.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a highly efficient symmetric key based key management protocol for group based communications in a distributed WSN with a cloud based NMM. The protocol establishes confidentiality, integrity and authentication for communication between an arbitrary group of motes in the network. In addition, the established group key is still kept secret for the NMM. Two different approaches are described to share the group keys with all members. In the unicast approach, each member receives the key using a unicast message, whereas in the multicast approach, a combination of Lagrange interpolation and a single multicast message is used to disseminate the group key to all members.
Simulations were done considering a different number of nodes in the group and a different number of hops from the publisher. Their results will be we discussed in an extended version of this paper: it is shown that the multicast approach results in all situations in a significant smaller delay, compared to the unicast approach. When the number of nodes in the network is larger than three, less link layer frames need to be sent over the network, resulting in better energy consumption behaviour. The additional code size required for the multicast approach is negligible.
